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INTRODUCTION
During a summer of public outcry over leg-
islative pay increases, two cost allocation pro-
visions with the potential to impact family
finances were quietly signed into Pennsylva-
nia law. The first provision, Act 42,1 amends
Pennsylvania's Public Welfare Code to limit
the availability of public financing for nursing
home and home-based care. The second, Act
43,2 moves a frequently overlooked provision 3
* © Copyright 2005 Katherine C. Pearson. Special
thanks go to Elizabeth Mattern for her excellent,
timely research help.
1 Act 42 (H.B. 1168), 2005 PA. LAws 123-137
(Session Laws) amending multiple sections of the
Public Welfare Code, enacted July 7, 2005, to take
effect "immediately."
2 Act 43 (S.B. 86), 2005 PA. LAWS 138 (Session
Laws) to be codified as 23 PA. CONS. Stat. §§4601-
4606 (July 7, 2005) (comprising Chapter 46 of the
Domestic Relations Code on "Support of the
Indigent"). Hereafter, citations to the recodified
statute refer to the numbering used in 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§§4601 et seq., rather than the Act.
from colonial era poor laws into a central po-
sition within Pennsylvania's modem Domestic
Relations Code, thus supplementing the cur-
rent support laws by providing authority for
courts to determine support obligations among
adult family members. In a technical sense,
these two provisions are not related except by
coincidence in numbering and their July 7 pas-
sage dates. As indications of a possible trend
in public policy on financing for long term
care, especially for the elderly, however, the
timing of these two pieces of legislation ap-
pears to be highly symbolic.
PENNSYLVANIA'S ACT 42-LIMITING
AVAILABILITY OF MEDICAID BENEFITS
A brief tutorial on Medicaid provides con-
text for the most recent changes, as well as sug-
3 62 PA. STAT. ANN. §§1971-1976 (entitled "Support
of the Poor by Relatives," repealed July 7, 2005).
This statute, while amended several times, can be
traced to 1937, with its antecedents in the Colonial
Laws of Pennsylvania 1705-6, ch. CLIV, §11, at 251-
253. Such familial or "filial" responsibility statutes
came to the colonies from England, influenced by
the Elizabethan Poor Laws of 1597 and 1601. See
Daniel R. Mandelker, Family Responsibility Under
the American Poor Laws, 54 MicH. L. REv. 497 (1956)
(noting that as of the time of his article "practically
all the states still have family responsibility provi-
sions based on the English model"). Beginning in the
1950's, many American states repealed their laws.
See Terrance Klein, A Rational Role for Filial Respon-
sibility Laws in Modern Society? 26 FAm. L. Q. 195,
196 (1992) (noting that by 1992 the number of U.S.
states retaining such laws had dropped from as
many as 45 to as few as 28).
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gesting the likelihood of future changes. Since
1965, under Title XIX of the Social Security
Act, Medicaid has provided federal tax rev-
enues for matching with state tax revenues to
provide a wide range of health related services
for persons who are elderly (age 65 or older),
blind or disabled, and who have very limited
income and minimal financial assets. During
the most recent fiscal year, Medicaid programs
"financed about $93 billion for long-term care
services" across the nation.4
In Pennsylvania, Medicaid is called "Medi-
cal Assistance"("MA") and consistent with the
national trend, it has been a significant source
of coverage for long-term care, including care
provided in nursing homes and in some in-
stances, for home and community-based care.5
Applicants must establish both financial and
medical eligibility. For example, Pennsylvania
generally permits a medically-qualified indi-
vidual no more than $2,000 in countable as-
sets, with the individual's home treated as a
non-countable asset if there is an expectation
of returning home or there is a community
spouse or dependent still living in the resi-
dence. 6 For individuals who qualify for MA,
4 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID
REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS ON TRANSFERS
OF ASSETS By ELDERLY INDIVIDUALS TO OBTAIN LONG-
TERM CARE COVERAGE, PUBL'N No. GAO-05-968, at
Highlights Page, (September 2005), available at
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-968 (last vis-
ited Oct. 4, 2005) (hereafter "GAO TRANSFER
REPORT").
5 For a succinct and helpful text on a major aspect
of MA in Pennsylvania, see ROBERT C. GERHARD,
PENNSYLVANIA MEDICAMD: NURSING HOME CARE (Bisel
2004).
6 Medicaid begins with a complicated federal um-
brella of statutes and regulations that overlay state
administered plans. See 42 U.S.C. §§1396-1395v
(Medicaid Act) and 42 C.F.R. §§430.0 et seq. The fed-
eral administering body is currently called the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
formerly called the Health Care Financing Agency
(HCFA). There is enormous variation from state to
state, and the menu of offerings within a state is
often highly complex, making Medicaid programs
and related public assistance programs difficult to
summarize. Pennsylvania's Department of Public
Welfare administers the Commonwealth's plan
for Medical Assistance to the elderly. See 62 P.S.
§§441.1 et seq. and 55 PA. CODE §§101.1. Some as-
pects of Pennsylvania's programs and eligibility
rules are described on-line. See e.g., www.dpw.state.
pa.us. Unfortunately many critical details are found
outside the formal rule-making process and are fre-
quently contained in difficult to obtain "operating"
Pennsylvania pays the difference between the
nursing facility's charge for providing care and
the amount that the individual is required to
pay from his or her monthly income toward
the cost of nursing facility care.7 Where the
covered individual has a community spouse,
Pennsylvania (as does every other state) per-
mits community spouses to keep some portion
of the couple's income and assets, and for
certain low income spouses there are special
calculations used to reduce the potential for
"impoverishment" of the community spouse.8
Periodically, especially during budget
crunches, there are calls for federal savings on
benefit programs, including Medicaid. 9 Early
in 2005, President Bush responded to pro-
jected budget deficits by calling for "$10
billion" in savings focused on Medicaid.' 0
handbooks, memos and guidelines that are not avail-
able on-line. See e.,g., the MEDICAL ASSISTANCE EIci-
BILITY HANDBOOK AND THE NURSING CARE HANDBOOK,
developed and issued by the Office of Income
Maintenance of the Pennsylvania Department of
Welfare for county assistance office (CAO) workers
with directions for handling MA application and
coverage issues. The propriety of important but "in-
formal" agency procedures has sometimes resulted
in successful legal challenges. See e.g., Dept. of
Environmental Resources v. Rushton Mining Co.,
591 A.2d 1168 (Pa. Comwlth. 1991).
7 See Pennsylvania DPW's on-line information
on general eligibility for nursing facility care under
MA at http://www.dpw.state.pa.us/LowInc/Med
Assistance/MAIEligibility/003670307.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 2, 2005). In certain instances, MA pays for
home based cared under a "waiver"-based program.
8 See Wisconsin Dept. of Health & Family Services
v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (2002) (analyzing Wis-
consin's plan for avoiding impoverishment of the
community spouse, known as an "income-first"
approach).
9 In 1988, one author commented on the federal
government's response to the then-perceived budget
crisis. "With a continuing increase in the reduction
of federal aid to the states over the past several years,
rising pressure has been placed on the states to find
alternative sources of funding for programs which
previously were primarily funded by the federal
government. That pressure has been multiplied by
skyrocketing medical costs and an increasing elderly
population. The Medicaid program ... is one such
[targeted] program." See e.g., George F. Indest, Legal
Aspects of HCFA's Decision to Allow Recovery from
Children for Medicaid Benefits Delivered to their
Parents Through State-Financial Responsibility
States: A Case of Bad Rule Making Through Failure
to Comply With the Administrative Procedures Act,
15 So. U. L. REv. 225 (Fall 1988).
10 "With Congress poised [prior to Hurricane
Katrina] to make budget cuts next month, AARP is
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Pennsylvania's own budget woes also required
state legislators to respond to the Governor's
call for cutbacks.
Against this backdrop of federal and state
budget concerns, Act 42 makes a number of
changes in Pennsylvania's rules for determin-
ing eligibility for MA, such as changing the
ways in which "spend-downs" for medical ex-
penses are calculated to reach eligibility,11 and
providing greater "penalty periods" for less-
than-fair-market transfers of assets. 12
Two provisions of Act 42 may prove partic-
ularly significant for low income families
facing long-term care decisions. Pursuant to
federal authority permitting states to adopt
"income-first" or "resource-first" calculations
to better protect community spouses from im-
poverishment arising from payment for their
spouse's long-term care, since 1996 Pennsyl-
vania has followed a "resource-first" approach
as a result of a settlement of a class action case
known as the Hurly case. 13 Pennsylvania's
resource-first approach permitted the low-
income community spouse to keep a greater
share of the couple's assets using a calculation
based on commercially available annuity
rates, but without requiring the community
spouse to purchase the actual annuity.14 Act 42
requires a spouse who wants to use the "re-
source-first" approach to actually purchase the
commercial annuity, naming the Department
as a contingent beneficiary.15 Pennsylvania's
lobbying Medicaid committee leaders to look to drug
pricing and long-term care reforms to help fund the
$10 billion reconciliation target." AARP Weighs in
on Medicaid Cuts, INSIDE CMS, August 11, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 12626175 (Westlaw News
Release Database).
11 Act 42 at Section 441.3, addressing "Use of
Medical Expenses to Establish Medical Assistance,"
to be codified as 62 P.S. §441.3.
12 Act 42 at Section 441.5, "Addressing Penalty
Period for Asset Transfer," to be codified as 62 P.S.
§441.5. The Bush Administration recently an-
nounced plans for additional savings through re-
strictions on transfers, by moving the beginning date
for any penalty period to the later of the date of an
asset transfer, or the date on which the individual
applies for Medicaid. See GAO TRANSFER REPORT,
supra note 4, at page 3.
"3 Hurly v. Houston, Case. No. 93-3666 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (unpublished settlement agreement). For a
helpful summary of the Hurly settlement, see
GERHARD, supra note 4 at §3.4
14 Id.
"5 Act 42, at Section 441.7, to be codified as 62 P.S.
§441.7.
private bar of elder law specialists widely view
this requirement as tying the community
spouse to an inflexible commercial product,
potentially resulting in community spouses
choosing to waive the benefits of the resource-
first approach to anti-impoverishment planning.
In addition, Act 42 makes changes to the cal-
culation of eligibility for home and commu-
nity based care services, matching the stricter
eligibility criteria to those already in place for
nursing home care,16 thus saving tax money-
but also perhaps reducing the incentive for the
community spouse to keep the more disabled
partner at home. Further, the eligibility restric-
tion was imposed even on persons who had
already qualified for the home services, thus
declining to grandfather-in families relying on
public assistance in keeping a care-dependent
loved one at home.
Act 42 impacts families, particularly modest
to low income community spouses, in re-
sponding to anticipated costs for long-term
care. In recent weeks, representatives of the
Elder Law Section of the Pennsylvania Bar
Association met with House and Senate mem-
bers from both sides of the aisles to address
concerns and to request postponement of cer-
tain provisions to permit determination of any
projected savings as compared to individual
hardships. 17 Some legislative members and
their staffers were sympathetic and described
the tension between a desire, on the one hand,
to continue public assistance aimed at quality
care and a need, on the other hand, to save
public dollars. Others expressed their strongly-
held opposition to any form of "Medicaid-
planning." The careful allocation of funds-
"Medicaid planning"-can frequently maxi-
mize the community spouse's ability to use
income and resources for his or her own inde-
pendent living, while accelerating the date of
eligibility for MA for the care-dependent
spouse1 8 and such planning is part of the ap-
proach contemplated by the federal legislators
1' Act 42, at Section 441.8, to be codified as 62 P.S.
§441.8.
17 As of the date of this article, the Department of
Public Welfare was preparing for immediate imple-
mentation, with an operations memorandum to
County Assistance Offices setting October 1, 2005 as
the start date.
18 For example, the home, an automobile, and pre-
paid burial plots or reserves are non-countable re-
sources, and Medicaid planning permits maximiz-
ing these resources.
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as protecting the community spouses from
complete impoverishment.' 9 But, Medicaid
planning has a controversial, at times even
notorious, reputation. 20 As one government
report notes, "[in some cases, individuals
might transfer assets to spouses or other family
members to become financially eligible for
Medicaid."21 However, individuals who trans-
fer countable assets for less than fair market
value prior to applying for Medicaid are pe-
nalized under a detailed statutory scheme that
denies coverage for specified periods of time-
and the ineligibility or "penalty" periods have
been increasing, even prior to 2005.22 Still,
there are persistent-and seemingly undocu-
mented-tales of "millionaires" who wrong-
fully qualified for millions of dollars in
Medicaid benefits. 23 Such rumors previously
19 Wisconsin Dept. of Health & Family Services, v.
Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (2002) (interpreting spousal
impoverishment provisions and noting Congress' at-
tempt to ameliorate "unintended consequences" of
a change in the Medicaid rules that counted joint
incomes in determining Medicaid eligibility that
potentially led to destitution of the community
spouse).
20 On September 7, 2005, for example, the Cato
Institute of Washington D.C. hosted a policy debate
on "Medicaid and the Long Term Care Crisis-Who
Should Pay?" with opposing perspectives articu-
lated by Stephen Moses, President of the Center for
Long-Term Care Reform, Inc., and Vincent Russo,
former President of the National Academy of
Elder Law Attorneys. See http://www.atlasusa.org/
calendar/details.php?refer-calendar&id:1030 (Cato
Institute Website, last visited October 3, 2005).
21 GAO TRANSFER REPORT, supra note 4, at "High-
lights" page.
22 See e.g., 42 U.S.C. §1396p(c)(1)(D) & (E) and 55
PA. CODE §178.104(d).
23 In September 2005, the U.S. General Account-
ing Office issued a report in response to Congres-
sional inquiries looking at current data on transfer of
assets. GAO reviewed "(1) the level of assets held
and transferred by the elderly, (2) methods used to
transfer assets that may result in penalties, (3) how
states determined financial eligibility for Medicaid
long-term care, and (4) guidance... [CMS] has pro-
vided states regarding the treatment of asset trans-
fers." GAO TRANSFER REPORT, supra note 4, at
"Highlights" page. The report found that in 2002,
"over 80 percent of the approximately 28 million el-
derly households (those where at least one person
was aged 65 or older) had annual incomes of
$50,000 of less, and about one-half had nonhousing
resources, which excluded the primary residence, of
$50,000 or less. About 6 million elderly households
(22 percent) reported transferring cash, with
amounts that varied depending on the household's
income and resource levels." Id. A chart prepared by
helped to fuel a short-lived federal attempt to
criminalize certain aspects of Medicaid-plan-
ning advice. 24 Countering such images are
reports 2 5 that suggest Medicaid-planning is
largely an approach taken by persons of com-
paratively modest means, leading some to ob-
serve that the completely destitute don't need
Medicaid planning and the truly wealthy don't
want it.2
6
PENNSYLVANIA'S ACT 43-FILIAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPPORT
Thus, as demonstrated by Act 42, during the
summer of 2005 Pennsylvania tightened the
GAO shows median and average figures for reported
transfers, ranging from a "low" average of $4,000 for
elderly households with yearly income of less than
$24,200 and non-housing resources of less than
$51,500, to a "high" average figure of $12,000, for
households with greater than $24,200 in yearly in-
come and greater than $51,500 in non-housing re-
sources. The report notes CMS's own description of
the "complexity of the current law" and CMS's ob-
servation that "data on the precise extent and cost of
assets transfers to the Medicaid program have been
difficult to gather." Id.
24 See the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, at 42
U.S.C. §1320a-7b(a)(b) (2004). But see New York
State Bar Association v. Janet Reno, 999 F.Supp. 710
(N.D. N.Y. 1998) (holding the criminalization at-
tempt to be an unconstitutional violation of the First
Amendment's protection for free speech, resulting in
injunctive relief).
25 In June of 2005, the Kaiser Family Foundation,
a non-profit private foundation focusing on major
health care issues, issued a report on Medicaid and
the uninsured that responded to concerns that assets
that could be tapped to pay for long term care were
being transferred to children or grandchildren, thus
unfairly shifting the burden from private to public
sectors. The prospective study concluded, "The vast
majority of elderly people at high risk for nursing
home use do not have assets to cover one year in
a nursing home . . . [T]hese findings suggest that
proposals that assume significant reductions in
Medicaid spending in the short-term by lengthening
the look-back period beyond three years or tighten-
ing asset transfer rules may fall short of expecta-
tions." Barbara Lyons et al., The Distribution of
Assets in the Elderly Population Living in the
Community, Kaiser Family Commission Study
Publication No. 7335, pages 4-6, published June 6,
2005, available at www.kff.org (last visited October
1, 2005).
26 See Alison Barnes, An Assessment of Medicaid
Planning, 3 HOUSTON. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 265, 269
(2003) (exploring pro and con perspectives on
Medicaid planning, including "some recognition
that Medicaid long-term care is no longer a welfare
benefit, but rather an entitlement for the prudent
middle class").
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budget belt another notch by focusing on
Medicaid funding. At the same time Pennsyl-
vania moved the possibility of family liability
for matters such as daily living expenses,
health care and long-term care from a meta-
phorical back closet to center stage. Act 43
shifts the key language from the welfare code
to the domestic relations code, specifying that
"all of the following individuals have the
responsibility to care for and maintain or
financially assist an indigent person":
(i) The spouse of the indigent person.
(ii) The child of the indigent person.
(iii) The parent of the indigent person.27
Parents already have well recognized, legally
enforceable obligations to provide support for
minor children28 and, in certain instances,
spouses are obligated to pay for each others'
"necessaries. '29 Portions of Act 43 impacting
on child or spousal support seem redundant
and potentially confusing.
The more interesting-and potentially con-
troversial-aspect of Act 43, however, is its
revitalization of a mostly dormant statutory
support obligation running from parents to
adult children-and from adult children to
parents. The idea of "filial" support obliga-
tions running between adult children and par-
ents is frequently described in case law and
commentary as inconsistent with the common
law tradition and contrary to the notion of
legal "emancipation" at age of majority.30
Pennsylvania courts have observed that "[alt
common law, an adult child has no duty or
27 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4603(a)(2).
28 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4321(2) (2001), providing "Parents
are liable for the support of their children who are
unemancipated and 18 years of age or younger."
29 See e.g., 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4102 (2001), providing
for "Proceedings in case of debts contracted for nec-
essaries." Compare 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4321(a), providing
"Married persons are liable for the support of each
other according to their respective abilities to pro-
vide support as provided by law."
30 Ordinarily in Pennsylvania, a parent is not
liable for support of an "emancipated" child. See
23 Pa.C.S.A. §4323 (2001). But see 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§4321(3) (2001) providing that "Parent may be liable
for the support of their children who are 18 years of
age or older" (emphasis added). See also Gaydos v.
Domabyl, 152 A. 549 (Pa. 1930) (noting that excep-
tion to general rule of emancipation, "if the child
was incompetent when he reached the age of 21 and
lived with his parents, they would be obliged to pro-
vide maintenance at common law").
obligation to contribute to the support of his
parents. Thus, whatever duty rests on a child
to support an indigent parent is imposed
solely by contract or statute.
31
The trigger for the filial care or financial
support obligation is the "indigency" of the
spouse, child or parent. Indigency, however, is
not defined by either the original law or the re-
codification. In older case reports, status as an
indigent or "poor person" or "pauper" was fre-
quently interpreted as meaning "one so poor
that he must be supported at public ex-
pense. '32 However, in 1945 the act was
amended to specify the indigent's right to fam-
ily support "whether a public charge or not,"
and the court's definition of indigency began
to expand.33 An "indigent person" was not
necessarily one who is "completely destitute
and helpless. '34 In 1981, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court observed that status as an "in-
digent" under the statute did not require the
person to be "helpless" nor in "extreme want,
[or] so completely destitute of property, as to
require assistance from the public [welfare]. 35
Both the earlier-era version and the recodi-
fled version of Pennsylvania's filial responsi-
bility law have limited defenses available to
the family member who is unwilling to assume
the financial responsibility for another. There
are two express statutory defenses: first, a fam-
ily member is not liable if the "individual does
not have sufficient financial ability to support
the indigent person," 36 and second, the adult
"child shall not be liable for the support of a
parent who abandoned the child and persisted
in the abandonment for a period of ten years
during the child's minority. '37 While being of
"insufficient financial ability" at first blush
31 Albert Einstein Medical Center v. Forman, 243
A.2d 181,183 (Pa. Super. 1968).
32 Case of Rising, 29 York 146 (1915). See also
Directors of the Poor v. Hickman, 4. Dist. 494 (1895).
33 Act 1945, EL. 865. See also Act 1945, P.L. 864,
deleting "grandparent and grandchild" from the list
of relatives liable for support.
34 Com. ex. Rel Home for the Jewish Aged v.
Kotzker, 118 A.2d 271, 273 (Pa. Super. 1955) (im-
posing monthly support duty on adult child for
father who received Social Security and charity from
Jewish home).
35 Verna v. Verna, 432 A.2d 630, 633 (Pa. Super.
1981) (ordering father to pay $50 per month towards
adult daughter's medical expenses).
36 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4603(a)(2)(i).
37 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4603(a)(2)(ii).
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appears to be a significant escape hatch,38
especially for modem adults accustomed to
a lifestyle heavily encumbered by home
mortgages and credit card debt, a review of re-
ported cases suggests some courts' unwilling-
ness to accept technical or superficial asser-
tions of insolvency as a defense. 39 In the fairly
recent case of Savoy v. Savoy, Pennsylvania's
Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order
requiring the son to pay monthly sums toward
his mother's health care debts despite evi-
dence that suggested the adult son's expenses
exceeded his monthly income, where the son
had taken over the family's business. 40
Unlike child support cases where there are
published guidelines for parental obligations,
the dollar calculation of any financial support
obligation under Act 43 will likely be case
specific and dependent on the trial judge's
response to the comparative assertions of
hardship. In the recodification effort, minor
wording changes were effected to bring the
predecessor statute, Section 1973, into compli-
ance with the modern court system for pur-
poses of court jurisdiction issues. However,
the financial allocation provisions of the older
law were imported virtually word for word,
providing in paragraph (1) that "except as set
forth in paragraph (2) the amount of the liabil-
ity [for support] shall be set by the court in the
judicial district in which the indigent person
resides. '41 This open wording appears to give
the trial court great leeway in assessing the
appropriate figure for a support order.42 In
paragraph (2), the discretion of the court is
reined in when assessing the family member's
38 See e.g., Goodman v. Delara, 281 A.2d 751 (Pa.
Super. 1971) (holding "the amount of the order must
be justified by the parent's present earning ability,
making due allowance for his own reasonable living
expenses,"noting that a support order cannot be
based on mere speculation about earning ability,
and recognizing "credibility" regarding income for
purposes of calculating support orders under 62 P.S.
§1973 is "certainly" for the trial court).
39 Americana Healthcare Center v. Randall, 513
N.W. 2d 536 (S.D. 1994) (analyzing South Dakota's
filial responsibility statute and recognizing support
duty where even though son was unable to pay his
mother's $36,000+ nursing home bill out of his own
income, he could pay it out of the proceeds he re-
ceived from distribution of his mother's mainte-
nance trust following her death).
40 Savoyv. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596 (Pa. Super. 1994).
41 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4603(b)(1).
42 See Goodman v. Delara, 281 A.2d 751 (Pa.
Super. 1971), discussed supra note 38.
liability for "medical assistance for the aged
other than public nursing home care."43 The
calculation then becomes the lesser of "six
times the excess of the liable individual's aver-
age monthly income over the amount required
for the reasonable support of the liable indi-
vidual and other person's dependent upon the
liable individual" or " the cost of the medical
assistance for the aged. 44
The revived indigent support statute pro-
vides "contempt" powers, authorizing the
court to imprison a defaulting family member
for up to six months "if the court determines
the individual liable for support has intention-
ally failed to comply" with the court's order.45
As with other provisions in the filial law, the
contempt power exists "regardless of whether
the indigent person is confined in a public in-
stitution," suggesting unpaid institutions such
as hospitals and nursing homes may have a
unique creditor's tool-threatening imprison-
ment for non-payment of their bills. 46 Petitions
for support of an indigent person may be
brought by the indigent person or "any other
person or public body or public agency having
any interest in the care, maintenance or assis-
tance of such indigent person. 47
While the core of most disputes would seem
likely to center on the liability provisions of
Section 4603, including the modernized but
still awkward language and calculations for
"medical assistance" for the "aged other than"
those in "public nursing home care," the re-
codified statute also carries forward the prior
law's rules for determining liability running
against the indigent's personal property, and
43 Id. at §4603(b)(2). As used in this provision, the
phrase "medical assistance" appears to mean gener-
alized health care expense (although it is not clear
whether that would include long-term care expense,
such as private facility costs), rather than "Medical
Assistance" in the Medicaid sense of the word.
44 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4603(b)(2)(i). For example, as-
sume an "indigent" aged parent has medical assis-
tance needs, and assume a son's monthly income
is $5,000 while his "reasonable" personal support
expenses total $3,000 per month. The remaining
$2,000, multiplied by 6, would give a figure of
$12,000, which would appear to be the son's maxi-
mum liability during a 12 month period, unless,
the "medical assistance" cost is actually less
than $12,000. There is no definition of "aged" in the
statute.
45 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4603(d)(1).
46 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4601(d)(2).
47 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4601(c).
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for liens against real property or "proceeds" of
causes of action. 48 Also contained within the
recodified indigent support law is a guardian-
ship provision,49 that seems to overlap and
provide opportunities for confusion with
Pennsylvania's detailed formal procedures for
guardianships.
50
IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM
RECODIFICATION
While several states51 in the nation continue
to have--and occasionally enforce-filial pro-
visions similar to Act 43, there appear to be
significant concerns triggered by Pennsyl-
vania's recodification effort.5 2 In response to
questions, some have suggested Act 43 was a
merely a routine step in the on-going efforts to
recodify Pennsylvania's many older provi-
sions, with no new public policy implica-
tions. 53 Yet it also appears that Act 43 focuses
on one comparatively small aspect of the
Public Welfare code, without reorganizing or
recodifying the rest of the public welfare
provisions.
Some have suggested Act 43 is necessary to
assist in "estate recovery" by the Department
of Public Welfare, pursuant to federal Medi-
caid provisions that direct states to pursue re-
48 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4604.
49 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4606.
50 Compare 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§5501-5555 (Guardian-
ships).
51 See e.g., articles described at note 3, supra,
describing state trends in filial support laws.
52 Pennsylvania's recodification effort may be part
of what some see as a "renewed interest in filial re-
sponsibility laws." Alison Barnes, An Assessment of
Medicaid Planning, 3 HOUSTON J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
265, 277 (2003), citing Seymour Moskowitz, Filial
Responsibility Statutes: Legal and Policy Considera-
tions, 9 J. L. & POL'Y 709, 714 (2001).
53 Following 1976 amendments to 62 P.S. §1973,
the Pennsylvania's Department of Public Welfare
was prohibited from using this provision as a basis
to seek reimbursement for MA from the adult chil-
dren of indigent persons. See e.g., 62 P.S. §432.6
(1976), which in turn was repealed (without reviv-
ing 62 P.S. §1973 for DPW) by later legislation. If
DPW takes the position at some future date that Act
43's recodification suddenly restored its discre-
tionary right to sue adult children for reimburse-
ment, a very dramatic change in policy would be
the result. This development would also suggest a
question about the candor of agency representatives,
supporters or drafters of Act 43 in describing it as
a "mere" recodification of "existing" law at the
eleventh hour that passage was sought on July 7th.
imbursement for public expenditures from the
probate estates of the Medicaid beneficiary.
5 4
However, in 1994 Pennsylvania adopted a de-
tailed set of provisions providing the Depart-
ment with extensive-and profitable-means
to obtain estate recovery and Section 43 does
not appear to provide "estate recovery" mea-
sures in the usual sense of that phrase.
55
It has been suggested that movement of the
filial or family support provisions assigns
them their "proper" place as part of a compre-
hensive family support network, making it
easier for family members, potential family
creditors and their attorneys to enforce the ex-
isting law and serving as a deterrence to fraud
or abuse by financially manipulative family
members. Supporters of filial responsibility
laws point to the 2003 case of Presbyterian
Medical Center v. Budd,56 in which the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court analyzed a nursing
home's claim against an adult daughter for her
mother's unpaid nursing home bills totaling
approximately $68,000. According to the opin-
ion, after her mother was admitted to the facil-
ity, the daughter represented to the facility that
she was applying for MA but instead the
daughter transferred to herself more than
$100,000 from her mother's bank accounts us-
ing a power of attorney.57 The court concluded
that the nursing home failed "to establish
every element of its fraud claim with sufficient
particularity, '58 and that the nursing home did
not have a valid claim under the Pennsylva-
nia's adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act,59 but the court also ruled that the
nursing home had a cause of action for the
daughter's liability under 62 P.S. §1973, the
predecessor to Act 4 3 .6 0 The court concluded a
"nursing home providing an indigent parent
with shelter, sustenance, and care has suffi-
cient 'interest' under 62 P.S. §1973 to bring a
support action against the parent's child." 61
54 E.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §1396p(b)(1).
55 See 62 Pa.C.S.A. §1412 and 55 PA Code §§258.1
et seq.
56 Presbyterian Medical Center v. Budd, 832 A.2d
1066 (Pa. Super. 2003).
57 Id. at 1069.
58 Id. at 1073.
59 Id. at 1074. The court did, however, note the
possibility of a timely claim having been made be-
fore the Orphan's Court for an accounting of the
Mother's estate. Id.
60 Id. at 1075.
61 Id.
RE-THINKING FILIAL SUPPORT LAWS IN A TIME OF MEDICAID CUTBACKS
The court noted the similarity between the
Budd daughter's manipulative behavior and
that of the adult child in Albert Einstein
Medical Center v. Forman,62 who also used a
power of attorney to deplete parents' assets
while refusing to pay for nursing home ex-
penses, behavior which also triggered the
court's reliance on Pennsylvania's filial re-
sponsibility law as an avenue for recovery.
63
The movement of the indigent support pro-
vision from the Public Welfare Code to the
Domestic Relations Code will undoubtedly
increase its visibility and the frequency of its
citation as a basis for claims by hospitals, nurs-
ing homes and similar creditors against avail-
able family members. One problem, however,
is that liability under Act 43 is not limited to
cases involving evidence of financial abuse or
manipulation-what might best be termed the
"bad" child cases-and ones that cry out for a
sanction. Rather, Act 43 exists as a potential
creditor's claim anytime someone believes a
particular adult child or other financially sol-
vent, "statutory" family member should be the
payer for the "indigent" person.
Indeed, a curious dichotomy appears to
exist with the juxtaposition of Medicaid and
renewed interest in filial responsibility laws.
Under current federal law, in determining eli-
gibility for Medicaid, states are permitted to
count spousal resources but are prohibited
from counting other family members' assets or
income.64 This has been interpreted in the past
as prohibiting states from denying Medicaid to
indigent persons who "could" ask for help
from more well-off family members. However,
the existing Medicaid law does not appear to
prohibit the agency from later using a filial re-
sponsibility statute to seek a support order on
behalf of the "indigent" person receiving MA
nor taking the role as a creditor seeking reim-
62 Albert Einstein Medical Center v. Forman, 243
A.2d 181 (Pa. Super. 1968).
63 Presbyterian Medical Center v. Budd, 832 A.2d
1066, 1076-77 (Pa. Super. 2003) (extending the
Forman case's reliance on Pennsylvania's filial
responsibility law to a nursing home's claim for
"support" made after the impoverished parent's
death).
64 42 C.ER. §435.602(a)(1) (providing that in mak-
ing Medicaid eligibility decisions, "[e]xcept for a
spouse of an individual or a parent for a child who
is under 21 or blind or disabled, the agency must not
consider income and resources of any relative as
available to an individual").
bursement. 65 As Pennsylvania and other states
are tightening the budget belt on Medicaid-
and also reviving old theories of family re-
sponsibility-the law makers do appear to be
sending a message about priorities in public
policy.
CONCLUSION
The implications of Act 43's revival of
Pennsylvania's filial or family responsibility
law are just beginning to appear on the hori-
zon, signaling important policy questions
about allocation of financial obligations be-
tween the public and private sectors. As a pro-
fessor who teaches courses on Conflict of
Laws, I will be looking for what frequently
happens when neighboring states take con-
flicting policy positions on disputes with
"cross-border" implications, and I foresee the
potential for neighboring states to refuse to en-
force Pennsylvania's filial support laws against
a targeted family member who resides in their
own state.
66
Further, as someone who used to work in a
family court clinical setting that was fre-
quently dominated by financial battles dis-
guised as "child custody" disputes, I worry
that we will see unintended consequences of
the state's renewed interest in filial responsi-
bility laws. I have observed Pennsylvania's
thoughtful Elder Law attorneys for more than
ten years, and have seen them deal with fami-
lies with complicated dynamics and tensions
that are greatly helped by careful Medicaid
planning. I have also seen families reject
Medicaid planning options when they reach
well-informed decisions that they can handle
65 But see, George F. Indest, Legal Aspects of
HCFA's Decision to Allow Recovery From Children
For Medicaid Benefits Delivered to Their Parents
Through State Financial Responsibility Statutes: A
Case of Bad Rule Making Through Failure to Comply
with the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 So.
U.L.Rev. 225 (1988) (taking the position that a 1983
federal government agency transmittal memo "al-
lowing" states to seek reimbursement for Medicaid
expenditures through the use of filial responsibility
statutes was not only "bad" rule-making--but also
"bad" policy). See also text at foonote 53, supra, sug-
gesting the potential for hidden policy changes.
66 See e.g., State Welfare Commissioner v. Mintz,
280 N.Y.S. 2d 1007 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967) (conclud-
ing that New York would not permit proceedings
against an adult child in New York on behalf of an
indigent parent in Connecticut, in light of New
York's limitations on filial responsibility laws).
PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION QUARTERLY
the costs of long-term care without public as-
sistance. I worry not about the families who
do get highly professional Medicaid planning
advice, but about those who don't.
For many years, I have been asking whether
attorneys should be advocating for enforce-
ment of filial responsibility laws to assist older
adults. Many families, of course, willingly as-
sume the moral responsibilities for filial care
without any need for prompting by a statute.
Some additional adult children may respond
to Pennsylvania's renewed interest in filial
supports law by accepting the obligation to
"care for and maintain" their older adults.
They may do so because they are persuaded
that the statutory law is right-and enforce-
able. But, if family members reluctantly un-
dertake a filial care obligation because they
fear the uncertainties of a state agency's or
court's decisions on what will be the dollar
value of their obligation to "financially assist"
the indigent individual, 7 I worry that such
action is neither the wisest-nor the safest-
result for our older adults.
67 Pennsylvania's filial responsibility law imposes
an alternative responsibility, the obligation to "care
for and maintain or financially assist" the indigent
family member. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4603(a)(1).
